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Abstract 
This research showed that changing attitudes toward stigmatized groups can be affected by 
both simple processes that require little thinking but also by traditional elaborative forms 
of persuasion that require high thinking processes.  Importantly, even when the obtained 
attitude change was equivalent for situations in which there was high and low message 
elaboration, the changes produced in high thinking conditions were found to be more 
resistant to further attacks than equivalent changes produced by less thoughtful 
mechanisms.  Not only were those attitudes more resistant as measured objectively (study 
1) but participants also perceived their attitudes to be subjectively more resistant (study 2). 
 3 
Attitudes refer to general evaluations people have regarding other people, places, 
objects, and issues (Eagly & Chaiken, 1993; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986).  Groups of people 
(e.g., the French, Asian, women) can be understood as attitude objects that can influence 
thoughts and actions.  As is the case with any other attitude object, one’s overall evaluation 
of the group (e.g., prejudice) can influence behavior toward members of that group (e.g., 
discrimination; e.g., see Dovidio, 2001).  The current research examines the importance of 
considering the basic process by which a reduction in prejudice toward stigmatized groups 
occurs.  In particular, we examine the implications of reducing prejudice through processes 
that require extensive or little amounts of thinking.   
Prejudice Reduction: Low Thinking Processes 
Based on the idea that contemporary prejudice is quite subtle (e.g., it can be held 
and expressed in unconscious ways; Devine, 1989; Dovidio & Gaertner, 2004; Pettigrew & 
Meertens, 1995), some scholars have considered that the best strategies for fighting it must 
also be subtle.  Thus, recommended techniques aimed at reducing prejudice are often based 
on processes that imply little thinking.  For example, the contact hypothesis (Allport, 
1954), one of the most well known strategies for reducing intergroup conflict, is proposed 
to rely on processes requiring little information processing, such as mere exposure 
(Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006) and classical conditioning (Dovidio, Gaertner & Kawakami, 
2003).  Indeed, two of the most primitive and effective means of changing attitudes involve 
mere repetition of the attitude object (mere exposure) and associating it with stimuli that 
already have a valence (conditioning; e.g., Kawakami, Phills, Steele & Dovidio 2007). 
Attitudes toward minority groups can be changed through other processes that also 
require relatively little thinking.  Some inference-based approaches, such as self-perception 
theory (Bem, 1965), illustrate this possibility by demonstrating that people sometimes infer 
their attitudes directly, and perhaps even automatically, in a manner similar to that by 
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which they infer the attitudes and traits of others (i.e., from observed behavior and the 
context in which it occurred; Uleman, 1987).  Thus, a White person who spends time with 
a Black person (e.g., sharing some activities in a contact-oriented experience) might 
conclude that “if we do things together, I must like this person.” 
Also consistent with the idea that attitude change toward minority groups can occur 
when thinking is low, a number of simple heuristics (Chaiken, 1980) can be relevant for 
reducing prejudice.  For example, low perceived consensus about one’s prejudices can 
decrease prejudiced responses toward Blacks (e.g., Festinger, 1954; Sechrist & Stangor, 
2001).  For example, people might use the heuristic: “if most other people do not seem 
prejudiced, it must be wrong.”  
In sum, attitude change toward stigmatized groups can occur through several 
processes that require relatively little thinking.  The articulated mechanisms provide 
plausible low effort processes by which prejudice reduction strategies (e.g., mere contact) 
might be effective in reducing prejudiced attitudes.   
Prejudice Reduction: High Thinking Processes 
As just noted, the accumulated work on prejudice reduction has suggested that a 
variety of low deliberation processes can produce attitude change toward stigmatized 
groups.   Many contemporary theories of prejudice presumably focused on these subtle 
processes of change because modern prejudice itself was thought to be subtle and covert 
(e.g., Dovidio, 2001).  However, low effort processes are not the only means of attitude 
change.  According to a variety of theories of persuasion, attitude change can also be 
produced by deliberative processes.  For example, one of the earliest deliberative theories 
argued that message learning was an important precursor of opinion change (Hovland, et 
al., 1953).  According to this framework, and based on the assumption that ignorance 
promotes prejudice (Stephan & Stephan, 1984), Pettigrew (1998) proposed that “learning 
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about others” is a critical step in how intergroup contact improves intergroup relations 
(Allport, 1954).  In accord with this view, there are numerous examples of how prejudice is 
reduced by attendance at diversity group seminars, and learning new information about 
other social groups (Fisher, 1968; Rudman, Ashmore & Gary, 2001).   
Another of the most influential deliberative theories of persuasion, cognitive 
response theory (Greenwald, 1968; Petty, Ostrom, & Brock, 1981), similarly postulated a 
relatively “thoughtful” mechanism underlying attitude change.  This theory expanded on 
the learning approach and contended that persuasion depended not on learning externally 
presented information per se, but on the extent to which individuals generated, articulated 
and rehearsed their own idiosyncratic thoughts about the information presented.  
Consistent with this framework, the self-generation of counter-stereotypical images and 
thoughts has proven to be an effective method of prejudice reduction (e.g., Blair, Ma & 
Lenton, 2001).  
In addition to these approaches, many other classic theories of persuasion proposed 
relatively deliberative mechanisms to account for changes in attitudes toward stigmatized 
groups.  For example, according to dissonance theory (Festinger, 1957), attitudes can 
change due to effortful cognitive reorganization stemming from the psychological tension 
induced by engaging in a discrepant action (e.g., Gray & Ashmore, 1975; Hing, Lee & 
Zanna, 2002; Leippe & Eisenstadt, 1994).  For example, interacting with a person toward 
whom one feels prejudice can lead to a change if people justify their action by generating 
reasons for it (e.g., “this person must have some merit if I am interacting with him”).  
Early research on role-playing also showed that active generation of a message, which 
involves an effortful process of biased scanning (Janis, 1968), can be a successful strategy 
for producing changes in the attitudes that people report toward minority groups (e.g., see 
McGregor, 1993).  
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Taken together, these studies suggest that in addition to relatively low elaboration 
mechanisms, high thinking processes such as the self-generation of counter-stereotypical 
thoughts or dissonance processes are also capable of producing changes in prejudiced 
attitudes.   
Prejudice Reduction: Multiple Processes 
The accumulated research on prejudice strongly suggests that attitudes toward 
stigmatized groups can be modified by both low and high thinking processes.  However, 
the vast literature on prejudice has not examined whether the mechanism of prejudice 
reduction matters, or if all that is important is that a reduction in prejudice occurs, 
regardless of mechanism.  Contemporary dual-process models of persuasion, such as the 
Elaboration Likelihood Model (ELM; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986) and the Heuristic 
Systematic Model (HSM; Chaiken, Liberman, & Eagly, 1989) were proposed to organize 
the low and high thought processes of social influence under a common conceptual 
framework and to establish the conditions under which each kind of process would affect 
attitude change.  Of particular importance for the current research, these theories also noted 
that although equivalent degrees of attitude change can occur when thinking is high or low, 
the consequences of the attitude change induced are different in each situation.  Thus, the 
ELM holds that the process by which an attitude is formed or changed is consequential for 
the strength of the attitude (see Petty & Krosnick, 1995).  Specifically, in a classic 
persuasion paradigm, when a treatment influences attitudes through low thinking processes 
(e.g., use of a variable as a peripheral cue), the attitudes formed tend to be less persistent, 
resistant to change and predictive of subsequent behaviors than when the same intervention 
produces the same amount of change through a high thinking process (e.g., biasing the 
thoughts generated; Petty, Haugtvedt, & Smith, 1995).  Thus, identifying the processes by 
 7 
which particular interventions reduce prejudice can be informative about the immediate 
and long-term consequences of the intervention.  
For example, in a consumer persuasion context, Haugtvedt and Strathman (1990) 
presented participants with an advertisement for a bicycle that contained strong arguments 
and positive cues.  Before reading the message, participants were informed that the bike 
would soon be available in their local area (high personal relevance) or only in a distant 
market (low relevance).  High (as opposed to low) personal relevance has been shown to 
increase processing of message arguments during message exposure and decrease reliance 
on peripheral cues (Petty et al., 1992).  Participants reported their attitudes about the 
product just after exposure to the ad, and again two days later.  Compared to participants in 
a control group, both high and low relevance (elaboration) participants showed more 
favorable attitudes toward the product on the first measure.  That is, participants changed 
their attitudes (showing equivalent initial attitude change) in response to the ad regardless 
of the amount of thinking devoted to the message.  Most importantly for the issue in 
question here, the results showed that the attitude change measured two days later were 
stable only for participants in the high (but not low) relevance conditions.  What remains to 
be examined is whether elaboration is also associated with different consequences in the 
domain of prejudiced attitudes.  Although attitudes toward a new bicycle showed the 
predicted effects, it is not clear if similar effects would be obtained when established 
attitudes are modified. 
Thus, the goal of the present research is to examine the role of elaboration in 
producing resistant changes in prejudiced attitudes toward stigmatized groups.  
Surprisingly, direct comparisons between thoughtful and nonthoughtful approaches to 
reducing prejudice have not been made.  One relevant study, however, was reported by 
Wegener, Clark and Petty (2006).  In a series of experiments, it was shown that group 
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stereotypes can influence judgments about individual people in both thoughtful and non-
thoughtful ways.  Although all the participants in these studies relied upon stereotypes in 
making explicit judgments about target individuals, and the judgments appeared to be the 
same (i.e., they were equally extreme) across high and low elaboration conditions, the 
consequences of these stereotype-based judgments differed depending on the amount of 
processing of the target information presented.  For example, judgments about the target 
individual that were based on thoughtful use of the stereotype were less likely to change in 
reaction to a challenge than were judgments based on less thoughtful use of the stereotype 
(i.e., using the stereotype as a simple cue).  Although this research clearly shows that the 
impact of stereotypes on judgments of novel individuals under high and low thinking 
conditions can vary as a function of how thoughtful the stereotype was, it does not address 
whether changes in group level attitudes are differentially consequential depending on how 
those changes were produced (see also Maio, Haddock, Watt, & Hewstone, 2009; for other 
relevant research on persuasion and prejudice). 
In short, what remains unaddressed in the literature on prejudice is whether it 
matters whether prejudice reduction is brought about by relatively high versus low thought 
processes.  In fact, one might argue that prejudiced attitudes are different from the other 
types of attitudes examined in a number of ways.   First, the attitudes examined in prior 
research focused on novel targets about which people did not have prior attitudes.  In the 
domain of prejudice, people already have information rich views and thus the mechanism 
of change might not matter as much.   
Second, prejudiced attitudes apply to a whole category of people whereas prior 
research on attitude strength has examined attitudes toward particular targets (e.g., ranging 
from one particular person, to one specific product or proposal).  It might not be the same 
to evaluate a consumer product, or a persuasive proposal, or even a particular individual, 
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than a whole stigmatized group.  Among other things, this is important because attitudes 
toward categories might be consequential (e.g., resistant and stable) even when changed 
through low thinking processes.  Alternatively, because categories apply to many different 
things, it might be particularly difficult to make them strong.  If that is the case, it would be 
inconsequential whether they were changed through high or low thinking processes.  
Third, it might be that low thinking mechanisms based on simple affective 
processes (e.g., classical conditioning, mere exposure) might produce stronger attitudes 
than high thinking processes when it comes to prejudiced attitudes.  This is because the 
attitudes examined in prior research tended to be cognitive in nature whereas prejudiced 
attitudes toward groups are often based on affect or emotion as much as or more than on 
cognition (e.g., Harris & Fiske, 2006; Smith & Mackie, 2005).  Given that, extensive 
cognitive processing of a relatively rational message might not be enough to produce any 
structural change in the attitude that would give it sufficient strength to persist, resist, and 
guide behavior.  Persuasion research on attitudes based on affect versus cognition has 
shown that messages that match the underlying basis of the attitude tend to be more 
effective than messages that mismatch (e.g., Fabrigar & Petty, 1999; Haddock. Maio, 
Arnold, & Huskinson, 2008).  Thus, processing a rational persuasive message might be 
relatively ineffective in producing consequential attitude change for prejudiced individuals.   
Finally, examining the role of elaboration in changing stigmatized attitudes can be 
important for a number of practical purposes, including the implications for designing 
more effective interventions capable of producing sustained changes.  In sum, our key 
research question concerns the extent to which persuasive messages can change attitudes 
toward stigmatized groups to a similar extent under high and low thinking conditions, and 
if so, to examine whether the underlying processes of change are relevant for the 
consequences associated with that persuasive impact. 
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Overview  
Previous research in the domain of attitude change has consistently shown that 
extensive processing and elaboration of information increases attitude strength (Petty et al., 
1995).  Although there is now considerable agreement that thoughtful and relatively non-
thoughtful attitude change processes can affect prejudice, it is less clear whether the 
changes in prejudice produced by deliberative processes also result in more resistant 
attitudes than changes produced by less thoughtful processes.  If so, this finding would 
clearly point to the importance of understanding the mechanisms by which a reduction in 
prejudice is achieved – a topic that has not received much scrutiny in the prejudice 
literature.  
To examine this issue more directly, we conducted two studies to test whether 
reducing prejudice in a thoughtful way would make the new attitude more resistant to 
subsequent attack than producing the same reduction in prejudice by less thoughtful 
means.  In two experiments, participants received a persuasive message composed of 
compelling arguments and positive cues in favor of South American immigrants in Spain.  
An attitude toward a stigmatized or minority group (e.g., South American immigrants in 
Spain) is considered prejudiced when it is less favorable than the attitude toward another 
non-stigmatized or majority group (e.g., Spaniards in Spain).1  The extent to which 
participants were motivated and able to think about these messages was manipulated or 
measured.  Across experiments, we assessed not only whether extensive message 
processing can reduce prejudice, but also the extent to which it has consequences for 
resistance compared to lower processing of the same messages.  Specifically, we 
hypothesized that even though the prejudiced attitudes of high- and low-elaboration 
individuals could both change to the same extent following a persuasive communication, 
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these attitudes would differ in their subsequent objective (study 1) and subjective (study 2) 
resistance to change.   
STUDY 1: Objective Resistance 
Our first study was designed to examine the effects of thinking about persuasive 
messages in reducing prejudice toward minority groups.  Furthermore, this study examined 
the effects of thinking on attitudinal resistance.  Attitudinal resistance refers to the ability 
of an attitude to maintain itself in the face of an attack, and is used as an objective indicator 
of attitude strength (see Petty & Cacioppo, 1986; Petty & Krosnick, 1995).  In this study, 
resistance was assessed objectively by exposing participants to a second, counter-
attitudinal message and measuring the resulting attitudes.  This measure of resistance is 
important because processes of change based on low thinking (such as classical 
conditioning and mere exposure) can sometimes create attitudes with relative stability 
(through multiple repetitions and exposures).  However, processes based on low (vs. high) 
thinking are less likely to create attitudes able to resist a compelling attack.  For example, 
pairing an attitude object with positive stimuli twenty times would result in a more 
accessible and stable attitudes than pairing those stimuli just one or two times (e.g., Fazio, 
1995).  These evaluations would also be relatively resistant to extinction in the absence of 
compelling challenges.  However, because these attitudes are based only on mere 
association rather than substantive information, they are not likely to be resistant when 
challenged with cogent evidence. 
In contrast, attitudes changed as a result of carefully considering strong arguments 
are more likely to resist change when attacked.  This is because elaboration typically 
involves accessing relevant information from both external and internal sources, making 
inferences, generating new arguments, and drawing new conclusions about the merits of 
the attitude object (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986).  The mental activities characterizing 
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elaboration involve people adding something of the their own to the information available 
and are likely to lead to the integration of all relevant information into the underlying 
structure for the attitude object, therefore making the adopted evaluation not only stable, 
but also coherent and resistant (Petty, et al.,1995, for a review).  Thus, people who possess 
accessible attitudes bolstered by considerable attitude-congruent knowledge are better able 
to defend their attitudes compared to those who have equally accessible and extreme 
attitudes that resulted from low thinking processes. In this study we measured extent of 
thinking by asking participants about their cognitive effort during the experiment. 
 The general prediction was that individuals whose attitudes are changed via high 
thinking processes would naturally resist the influence of an attack because they would be 
able to marshal their own initial cognitive responses to defend their viewpoint.  When 
attitudes are formed or changed via low thinking processes such as by relying on simple 
cues (e.g., there were many arguments in favor of the issue), however, people would be 
relatively less able to marshal a defense of their opinions (e.g., Haugtvedt & Petty, 1992).  
Thus, our hypothesis was that the attitude change of high elaboration participants 
following an initial message would be comparable to that of low elaboration participants.  
However, we expected the attitude change of high elaboration participants would prove 
more resistant to the effect of attacking information than the attitude change of low 
elaboration participants.  
Method 
Participants and Design 
 Seventy-three undergraduates (51 women and 22 men) (mean age: 19.80; SD = 
1.33) from the Universidad Complutense de Madrid (UCM) were randomly assigned to the 
conditions of a 2 (Message vs. Control) X Extent of elaboration (continuous variable) 
design.  None of the participants was South American.  After the first message about 
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immigrants or the control message, all participants received a message inconsistent with 
the pro-immigration advocacy. The key dependent measure of resistance was change in 
attitudes from Time 1 to Time 2. 
Procedure 
 First, participants read a persuasive message in favor of South American 
immigrants or a race-irrelevant message.  The control topic concerned the benefits of 
eating vegetables.  After reading the persuasive or the control message, all participants 
were asked to complete a questionnaire designed to assess their attitudes in relation to 
South American immigrants.  After completing the questionnaire they were presented with 
a message in the form of a newspaper article about Latin gangs, in which several crimes 
committed by South American immigrants were mentioned.  Finally, participants’ attitudes 
towards South American immigrants were assessed a second time using another paper 
questionnaire. 
Independent Variables 
 Persuasive message.  Participants were randomly assigned to the persuasive 
message condition or to the control message condition.  In the persuasive message 
condition, participants were asked to read a positive persuasive message about South 
American immigrants.  The persuasive message was constructed to contain both strong 
arguments and positive peripheral cues, so that both high and low-elaboration individuals’ 
attitudes could change.  The message in favor of South American immigrants contained 
seven strong arguments about the benefits of receiving immigrants.  The arguments 
selected were pre-tested and shown to produce mostly favorable thoughts when people 
were instructed to think about the messages.     
The gist of one of the strong arguments was that South American immigrants help 
to stimulate the national economy because of their crucial role in the industrial 
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infrastructure.  In addition to a large number of compelling arguments, the presence of 
which could serve as a positive cue (Petty & Cacioppo, 1984), the message also contained 
other information that could serve as positive cues for identifying the direction and 
credibility of the proposal.  For example, the information was claimed to be taken from 
prestigious sources with high credibility (e.g., Wall Street Journal, prestigious 
sociologists).  The positive direction of the message was also evident from the title of the 
message (The Benefits of Immigration), which could work as an important cue for 
participants to be able to infer the position advocated even without thinking about the 
merits of the arguments.    In the control message condition, participants read an 
immigrant-irrelevant, positive message about the benefits of including vegetables in one’s 
diet.   
Extent of elaboration.  Elaboration was assessed using two questions about 
perceived cognitive effort.  Participants rated the extent of their thinking about the message 
on two 9-point semantic differential scales anchored as follows: low thinking vs. high 
thinking, and low attention paid versus high attention paid.  The two measures were 
correlated (α = .73) and were averaged to form one measure of elaboration.  Previous 
research has shown this measure to be effective in discriminating participants who had 
engaged in relatively high and relatively low thinking in particular contexts (e.g., Petty, 
Briñol, & Tormala, 2002).  Scores were not affected by the message manipulation, Fs < 1.  
Dependent Measures 
 Prejudiced attitudes following the initial message.  Participants’ attitudes toward 
immigrants were assessed by averaging the responses to five highly related (α = .82) nine-
point scales (i.e., unappealing vs. appealing, unpleasant vs. pleasant, not recommendable 
vs. recommendable, unlikeable vs. likeable, I do not like them vs. I do like them).  
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 Prejudiced attitudes following the second message.  After reading the first message 
and reporting their attitudes toward immigrants, all participants received a second message 
which implied that immigration was potentially problematic.  After reading about the costs 
involved in immigration, participants were again asked to report their attitudes toward 
South American immigrants.  This was done on the same five 9-point semantic differential 
scales used previously.  Responses to these attitude items were intercorrelated (α = .93) 
and were averaged to create a composite measure of attitudes.   
Resistance to Change. To create an index of attitude change in response to the 
second message, we subtracted Time 1 attitudes from Time 2 attitudes (for a similar 
procedure, see, e.g., Tormala, Clarkson & Petty, 2006).  Higher attitude change scores 
reflected less resistance. As noted, this measure is particularly relevant to this research 
because individuals who possess attitudes based on high thinking processes are predicted 
to be better able to defend against counter-attitudinal messages compared to those who 
have equally extreme attitudes that resulted from low thinking processes. 
Results 
All dependent measures were submitted to a multiple regression analysis, with 
Persuasive Message (Message vs. Control; dummy coded), and Extent of Elaboration 
(continuous variable) as the independent variables.  Analyses followed the regression 
procedures outlined by Aiken and West (1991).    
Prejudiced Attitudes (Time 1).  As expected, the results of a Persuasive Message X 
Elaboration regression analysis at Time 1 revealed only a significant main effect of the 
Persuasive Message,  = .27, t(69) = 2.39, p = .01.  This main effect indicated that 
participants’ attitudes were more favorable toward immigrants after reading the relevant 
persuasive message (M = 5.29, SD = 1.38) than after reading the control message about the 
benefits of eating vegetables (M = 4.49, SD = 1.33).  Moreover, the main effect of 
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Elaboration (p > .97), and the two-way interaction (p > .33) were not significant indicating 
that regardless of level of thinking, the relevant message produced the same reduction in 
prejudice.    
Prejudiced Attitudes (Time 2).  We submitted attitudes at Time 2 (after receiving 
the attacking message) to the same analysis.  Given that there were no differences other 
than the message effect on initial attitudes, we included those attitudes at Time 1 as a 
covariate in this multiple regression analysis. Attitudes at Time 1 significantly predictied 
attitudes at Time 2,  = .68, t(65) = 7.99, p < .001.  Most importantly, there was a 
significant interaction between Message and Elaboration on this measure,  = .24, t(65) = 
2.93, p = .005.  This interaction revealed that the persuasive effect of the initial message 
was only evident for high,  = .40, t(65) = 3.48, p = .001, and not for low thinking 
participants,  = -.05, t(65) = -.47, p = .63.  That is, the initial prejudice reduction message 
was more effective after an attack for those who reported high rather than low thought 
about it. 
Resistance to change.  We submitted the attitude change index (which considered 
attitudes at Time 1 and 2) to analysis.  As expected, there was an interaction between 
Persuasive Message and Extent of Elaboration,  = -.29, t(65) = -2.48, p = .01.  Only 
participants who received the Persuasive Message in favor of immigrants showed the effect 
for Extent of Elaboration  = -.55, t(38) = -4.11, p < .001.  Attitudes resisted less in 
response to the second message when participants reported having thought less (i.e., low-
elaboration) rather than more (i.e., high-elaboration) about the relevant message.  
Resistance was not affected by Extent of Elaboration for those who received the control 
message,  = .12, t(25) = .61, p = .54.  
Discussion 
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 The results of Experiment 1 showed that prejudiced attitudes can be changed after 
reading a persuasive message in favor of the benefits of immigration.  Importantly, the 
initial effect of the persuasive treatment was evident regardless of the amount of thinking 
devoted to the message.  That is, individuals high and low in elaboration both reported 
equivalently more positive attitudes toward immigrants after reading the persuasive (vs. 
control) message.  This is consistent with previous research in the domain of persuasion, 
showing that attitudes can change through thoughtful processes and non-thoughtful 
processes to a similar extent. 
 Also important is the fact that, although elaboration did not influence attitude 
favorability after the first message, the results revealed that individual differences in the 
amount of thinking reported by participants affected an objective measure of attitude 
resistance.  Thus, high (vs. low) thinking participants formed stronger attitudes as a result 
of the persuasive treatment to reduce prejudice.  Although participants were initially 
affected by the persuasive message in favor of South American immigrants regardless of 
the amount of thinking, the resulting initial attitudes were more resistant to change for high 
thinking conditions.  Thus, attitudes of high-elaboration individuals changed less after 
reading the anti-immigrant article than did the attitudes of low-elaboration individuals. 
 High elaboration participants presumably resisted the second message because their 
careful analysis of the first message motivated and enabled them to counter-argue the 
attack.  Low elaboration participants presumably succumbed to the second message 
because they were less motivated or able to defend their new attitudes.  In other words, 
having thought about the initial position carefully not only enables people to bolster their 
initial attitudes and counter-argue an opposing message, but probably also gives them the 
motivational confidence to do so.  
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Finally, it is important to note that resistance was assessed objectively in this study 
by exposing participants to a second, counter-attitudinal message and measuring the 
resulting attitudes.  As shown, measured elaboration predicted objective resistance.  It is an 
open question whether manipulated (rather than measured) elaboration would produce 
similar effects.  This is an important issue given that the present study only provided 
correlational evidence for our critical hypothesis, and more evidence of the causal role of 
elaboration is desirable.  On the other hand, it is not clear whether elaboration only predicts 
objective resistance or also is capable of affecting the subjective feeling of resistance.  
Thus, the next study tested the extent to which participants have some subjective sense of 
the enhanced resistance of their attitudes following an experimental manipulation of 
thinking.  Having a measure of subjective change is important because, among other 
things, it predicts other strength related outcomes.  
STUDY 2: Subjective Resistance 
Study 2 was designed to replicate and extend the findings of the prior study.  The 
first study showed that attitudes toward South American immigrants formed through high 
(vs. low) elaboration processes were stronger according to a measure of objective 
resistance to change.  In this second study we examine whether elaboration can also affect 
attitude strength, using the subjective measure of perceived resistance.  Perceived 
resistance has been defined as the subjective perception that one’s opinion could resist 
persuasion if it were attacked, and has been used as a subjective indicator of attitude 
strength (e.g., White, Tashchian & Ohanian, 1991).  The perception that people have with 
regard to the resistance of their attitudes has been shown to play an important role in 
decision making (e.g., exposure to counter-attitudinal information; Albarracín & Mitchell, 
2004).  Furthermore, perceived resistance has been found to influence information 
processing, and actual attitude change (Briñol, Rucker, Tormala, & Petty, 2004).  Another 
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benefit of this measure is it allows us to see whether or not participants have some 
subjective sense of the enhanced strength of their attitudes.  In the prior study we looked at 
actual resistance and it was not clear if participants were aware that their attitudes were 
stronger.  Awareness of strength could provide some motivation to defend one’s attitude 
and act upon it. 
Most importantly, in the current study we sought to conceptually replicate our prior 
findings by manipulating (rather than measuring) the key moderating variable: elaboration.  
Although the measure of elaboration used in our prior study has proven effective for 
distinguishing high and low thinking individuals, it provides only correlational evidence 
for our critical hypothesis.  Given the importance of elaboration in the present research, we 
manipulated this variable in order to permit more causal conclusions with respect to extent 
of thinking.  Therefore, instead of measuring the extent to which participants attended to 
and elaborated on the information contained in the persuasive message, in this study we 
manipulated the extent of thinking by framing the message as personally relevant or 
irrelevant (e.g., see Petty & Cacioppo, 1979) and by enhancing (or undermining) the ability 
to think about the proposal with a distracting secondary task (e.g., see Petty, Wells, & 
Brock, 1976). 
Following the logic outlined above, we predicted that participants who thought 
more about the persuasive message (high thinking condition) would perceive their attitudes 
to be more resistant to change than participants who thought relatively less about the 
message (low thinking condition) despite equivalent reductions in prejudice.   
Method 
Participants and Design  
 One hundred and three undergraduates (81 women and 22 men; mean age: 19.81; 
SD = 1.81; white Europeans) from the Universidad Autónoma de Madrid (UAM) were 
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randomly assigned to the conditions of a 2 (Message vs. Control) X 2 (High Elaboration 
vs. Low Elaboration) design.  Students participated in partial fulfillment of a requirement 
for their Introductory Psychology courses.  
Procedure 
 On arrival at the laboratory, participants read a persuasive message in favor of 
South American immigrants or an irrelevant message about the benefits of eating 
vegetables.  They were then asked to complete a paper questionnaire designed to assess 
their attitudes about South American immigrants. 
Independent Variables 
 Persuasive message.  Participants were asked to read a persuasive message in favor 
of South American immigrants, or read an unrelated message about the benefits of 
including vegetables in one’s diet.  The message in favor of South American immigrants 
was the same as that used in Study 1, and was designed to contain both strong arguments 
and positive cues.  
 Extent of elaboration.  In this study, the extent of thinking was manipulated by 
framing the message as personally relevant or irrelevant (e.g., Petty & Cacioppo, 1979) 
and by enhancing or undermining the ability to think about the proposal (e.g., Petty, et al., 
1976).  Participants in the high-elaboration condition were told that the message had to do 
with their self-concept whereas those in the low elaboration conditions were not given this 
information (for a similar induction, see, e.g., Briñol, Petty, & Wheeler, 2006).  
Furthermore, the ability to think in the low elaboration condition was restricted by the 
presence of a distracting secondary task, whereby while reading the persuasive message 
participants were required to memorize an eight-digit number (see Wegener, et al., 2006).  
To further convey the importance of this memorizing task, each participant was asked to 
report the number at the end of the questionnaire.  Moreover, participants in the low 
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elaboration condition were told not to spend more than one minute reading the message 
(half the time a person would normally spend doing the same task).  For participants 
assigned to conditions with low cognitive load, instructions were given to read (work) at 
their own pace. 
Dependent Variables  
 Prejudiced attitudes.  After reading the persuasive message, participants reported 
their attitudes toward South American immigrants.  These attitudes were assessed by 
averaging the responses to the same five 9-point scales as in the previous study (α = .90).  
 Perceived resistance.  After reporting their attitudes toward immigrants, 
participants were asked to rate how strong they perceived those attitudes to be.  More 
specifically, they were asked to rate the extent to which they thought their attitude would 
be likely to change in the future.  Perception of change was rated on a 9-point semantic 
differential scale anchored at “extremely likely to change” (1) and “not at all likely to 
change” (9).  
 Elaboration manipulation check.  At the end of the experiment, participants 
completed a manipulation check for the elaboration induction.  Specifically, they were 
asked to report how much they thought about the message on two items: (a) “I paid a lot of 
attention to the information that was presented to me”, and (b) “I thought a lot about the 
information and the arguments that were presented to me.”  Responses to these two items 
were given on 1-9 point scales anchored by “not at all” and “very much.”  Ratings on these 
items were highly inter-correlated (α = .81), so that they were averaged to form one overall 
elaboration index.  These items were included at the end of the study so that they would 
not influence the perceived resistance measure.   
Results 
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 All dependent measures were submitted to a 2 (Extent of Elaboration: low or high) 
X 2 (Persuasive Message: Message in favor of South American immigrants vs. control) 
analyses of variance (ANOVA). 
 Manipulation check.  As expected, the ANOVA showed that participants assigned 
to the high elaboration condition reported having thought more about the persuasive 
communication (M = 7.89, SD = .86) than participants who were assigned to the low 
elaboration condition (M = 7.01, SD = 1.47), F(1,101) = 13.71, p < 0.001. 
 Prejudiced attitudes.  Consistent with our expectations, analysis of the prejudice 
measure revealed a main effect for Persuasive Message.  Participants showed relatively 
more favorable attitudes toward South American immigrants after reading the relevant 
persuasive message (M = 5.87, SD = 1.36) than after reading the control message about 
eating vegetables (M = 5.31, SD = 1.4). F(1,101) = 3.87, p = .05.  Apart from this, there 
was no effect for Extent of Elaboration (p > .48), and the two-way interaction was not 
significant (p > .62) replicating the findings of our first study that regardless of extent of 
elaboration, the persuasive message appeared to influence an initial measure of attitudes 
toward the stigmatized group. 
Perceived resistance.  Results of the 2 X 2 ANOVA on the resistance measure 
revealed a significant main effect of Elaboration, such that participants who thought more 
about the message reported stronger attitudes (M = 6.56, SD = 1.48) than participants in the 
low elaboration condition (M = 5.76, SD = 1.80) F(1,101) = 3.99, p = .04.  This main effect 
was qualified by the expected interaction between Message and Elaboration, F(1,99) = 
3.99, p = .04, revealing that the effect of thinking was only significant for participants who 
received the relevant message but not for those in the control group.  As predicted, 
participants who thought more about the relevant message perceived their attitudes to be 
more resistant to change (M = 6.93, SD = 1.34) than those who thought less about that 
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message (M = 5.62, SD = 1.80), t(59) = -3.25  p = .002.  For participants who read the 
control message, perceived resistance did not differ for those in the high (M = 6.00, SD = 
1.54) and low (M = 6.00, SD = 1.89) thinking conditions, t(40) = .00, p > .90. 
Discussion 
As in the previous study, the results of this experiment revealed that the attitudes 
about immigrants of high and low elaboration individuals were statistically comparable 
immediately after the presentation of the persuasive message in favor of South American 
immigrants.  However, the participants in the high (vs. low) thinking condition perceived 
their attitudes to be more resistant to change.  Although we used a different procedure to 
examine the amount of thinking in this study, and a different measure of attitude strength, 
these findings replicate those obtained in our previous study.  Attitudes toward South 
American immigrants were not only more resistant to change (Study 1) for participants in 
the high (vs. low) thinking conditions, but as shown by this study, were also perceived to 
be that way. 
GENERAL DISCUSSION, SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
Taken together, our two studies demonstrate that attitudes toward stigmatized 
groups can be affected not only by simple processes that require little thinking (as 
suggested by much previous research) but also by traditional elaborative forms of 
rhetorical persuasion (as implied by the attitude change literature).  Across both studies, we 
found that prejudiced attitudes toward stigmatized groups could be reduced through 
persuasive messages.  Most importantly, our studies demonstrated that persuasion 
treatments can be designed so that the degree of attitude change is equivalent for situations 
in which there is high versus low message elaboration.  However, although both high and 
low thinking processes were associated with the same changes in attitude favorability (i.e., 
reduced prejudice), the consequences of those processes were quite different.  The changes 
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produced in high thinking conditions were found to differ from less deliberative changes 
produced by the same persuasive treatments in a number of important ways.  Specifically, 
the present research revealed that changes produced by high thinking processes were more 
resistant (Study 1) to further attacks than equivalent changes produced by less thoughtful 
mechanisms.  Furthermore, participants apparently were aware of the increased strength of 
their attitudes (Study 2) perhaps motivating them to defend their attitudes and use them in 
guiding behavior.  Understanding the nature of the processes by which attitudes change is 
essential because it informs us about both the immediate and long-term consequences of 
those changes.  The current research indicates that the processes by which prejudice is 
changed are also important to understand because of the consequences involved.  In cases 
of high (vs. low) elaboration (i.e., situational high thinking individuals, high personal 
relevance situations) changes in both objective and subjective attitude strength measures 
were observed for prejudicial attitudes.  This result is notable because there are many prior 
studies examining ways to reduce prejudice, but prior work has not examined whether the 
mechanism of change matters. 
Although our two studies focused exclusively on the exploration of resistance 
(actual and perceived), future studies should also explore other potential consequences of 
changes in attitude strength dependent upon the extent of thinking.  It seems plausible to 
argue that changes in prejudiced attitudes, like changes in any other attitudinal object 
(Petty et al., 1995), induced through relatively deliberative processes might also be 
particularly persistent, and impactful for information processing and behavior.  For 
example, since elaboration strengthens object-evaluation associations, the more thinking a 
person does, the more likely the evaluation is not only to be resistant when challenged (and 
to be perceived as resistant), but also to have an impact on judgment and behavior.   
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Showing the impact of elaboration on different indexes of resistance (actual and 
perceived) is important because these two constructs can sometimes be relatively 
independent.  Past research has shown that people can see no change in their attitudes 
when there actually has been change and see some change when there actually has been 
none (see Schryer & Ross, in press; and Briñol & Petty, for reviews).  Future research 
should examine whether changes based on high thinking processes are more likely to lead 
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1  Although in Spain, attitudes toward South American immigrants tend to be positive in absolute 
terms (e.g., on the positive side of a scale), these attitudes were assumed to be less favorable than 
those toward the dominant (majority) group (Spaniards).  Given that whether an attitude is 
prejudiced or not is a relative (rather than an absolute) question, such evaluations can be considered 
prejudiced toward immigrants.    To verify our assumption of prejudice toward South American 
immigrants in Spain, we collected data from the current subject population by randomly assigning 
a sample of 158 students to indicate how much they liked either Spaniards or South-Americans on 
scales ranging from 1 (not at all) to 9 (extremely).  Consistent with the idea that evaluations of 
immigrants are less favorable than those toward natives, participant’s evaluations toward the out-
group (South American immigrants) were significantly less positive (M = 5.7, SD = 1.09) than 
participant’s evaluations of the in-group (Spaniards) (M = 6.23, SD = .93), t(152) = 3,27, p = .001.  
That is, even though attitudes toward a South American immigrant were on the positive side of the 
scale, attitudes were still less favorable than those toward the dominant (majority) group.  
Furthermore, these evaluations were significantly correlated (r = .58, p = .01) with behavioral 
intentions toward these groups (composite measure of items such as “Would you be willing to hire 
people from this group?”).  These findings suggest that the measures used in this research can have 
real world implications for potential discrimination. 
 
